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Abstract¹

Public policy intended to address risks is largely determined by government officials who are typically elected by ‘the people’. Lay people presumably support political figures most likely to tackle the risks *perceived* as relevant. The present research investigated whether risk perceptions vary by risk domain and socio-political ideology. American community adults ($N=387$) recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk completed measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), political conservatism, and perceived domain risks. Risk perceptions of conservatives versus liberals systematically differed by domain: Increases in political conservatism (*vs.* liberalism) and RWA were associated with perceiving “personal danger” hazards as more risky, whereas increases in SDO were associated with perceiving “competitive” hazards as less risky. A liberal-orientation was associated with heightened risk concerning collective (shared) hazards.



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¹ Final submitted copy does not reflect changes made before publication.

“[Pollution is] threatening to push the planet past a tipping point beyond which climate change would be difficult to stop” (Al Gore; in Greene, 2006).

“They’ve called [birth control] preventative medicine ... preventing babies from being born is not medicine... that’s not constructive to our culture and our civilization. If we let our birth rate get down below replacement rate we’re a dying civilization” (2011, Steve King).

The world is plagued by far-reaching risks, many with irreversible outcomes: Nuclear weapons and nuclear accidents, global economic crises, (man-made) climate-change, and unprecedented human migration. Clearly, public policy regarding risk management can have global implications. Despite this urgency, Western governments currently appear stalled, often embroiled in “partisan standoffs”, perhaps as political strategy. As the opening quotes illustrate, public figures advocate political positions by emphasizing specific risks (i.e., climate change, contraceptives) to influence the voting public. Unknown is the extent to which lay peoples’ *risk perceptions* might systematically vary as a function of risk domain and political ideology. Might conservative-leaning and liberal-leaning individuals differ in what psychologically constitutes a threat, and by implication, what problems need redress?

Socio-Political Ideology and Threat

Psychologists have long been interested in the association between threat and socio-political ideology (Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt, 2001; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Wilson, 1973). Political conservatives (“right-wingers”), more so than liberals (“left-wingers”), are generally considered threat-sensitive (Altemeyer, 1996; Jost et al., 2003a; Oxley et al., 2008). Jost and his colleagues demonstrated that political conservatism is associated with underlying needs relating to uncertainty and fear/threat (Jost et al., 2003a). Exposure to threat

fosters a politically conservative (*vs.* liberal) orientation (Jost, Fitzsimmons, & Kay, 2004).

Thorisdottir and Jost (2011, Study 2), for instance, showed that manipulations of terrorism threat increase political conservatism (*vs.* liberalism). Thus, research generally supports the notions that political conservatism reflects a “generalized susceptibility to experiencing threat or anxiety in the face of uncertainty” (Wilson, 1973, p. 259), and that exposure to threat can foster a politically conservative orientation (Altemeyer, 1996; Thorisdottir & Jost, 2011).

Political conservatism can be defined as comprising two core components: Preference for tradition rather than support for social change, and acceptance versus rejection of inequality (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Although conservatives might also demonstrate a preference for social change (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003), such as supporting social reform to limit abortion or re-instate prayer in schools, these preferences often reflect an aspiration to return to traditional social conventions (Jost et al., 2003b). These two core components can be assessed with measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996, characterized by support for conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression), and social dominance orientation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; SDO, characterized by a preference for hierarchical versus egalitarian intergroup relations) (Jost et al., 2003a). The two component approach is a popular contemporary way of conceptualizing political conservatism. It should be noted, however, that there are several ways of studying differences between political liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning individuals. Haidt and colleagues, for instance, maintain that political ideology can be characterized by the relevance of five or six moral foundations (Haidt, 2012; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Given its prominence in the literature, however, we operationalize political conservatism according to the two core components (resistance to change; acceptance of inequality). Drawing on the two component approach, individual

differences in political conservatism can be therefore measured in several ways: As self-identification on a liberal versus conservative continuum (what we call “political conservatism”), via RWA, or via SDO.

Theoretically, the two core components of conservatism are driven by different types of threat. According to Duckitt (2001), RWAs and SDOs are driven by distinct motivations, leading to different worldviews, such that RWAs perceive the world as unpredictable, unsafe, and unstable, whereas SDOs perceive the world as competitive, and strive for dominance and superiority. These divergent worldviews in turn often predict divergent social attitudes. There is considerable empirical support for Duckitt’s (2001) model. RWAs and SDOs dislike outgroups associated with their specific threat-sensitivities: RWAs report negative attitudes toward dangerous groups (terrorists), SDOs report negative attitudes toward disadvantaged, low-status groups (physically disabled) (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Even the political stances shared by RWAs and SDOs can be attributed to distinct threat perceptions. Specifically, individuals higher in RWA and those higher in SDO supported American involvement in the war in Iraq (McFarland, 2005), but for different reasons: RWAs’ support was explained by perceptions of threat/danger from Iraq; SDOs’ support was explained by competitive-related beliefs, in particular, a lack of concern for loss of human life.

Notwithstanding the widely-accepted notion that conservative-leaning individuals (political conservatives, high RWAs, high SDOs) are especially sensitive to threats, there are psychological reasons that liberal-leaning individuals (political liberals, low RWAs, low SDOs) might also be sensitive to risks, albeit different risks. This assertion has yet to be investigated systematically. Anecdotally, American liberals appear more concerned about risks associated with climate change (Jones, 2010) or handguns, suggesting that liberals are also threat-sensitive,

simply in different domains than conservatives. For instance, research on aid allocation demonstrates liberals especially are “threatened” by the negative plight of others. In response to others’ suffering, liberals tend to experience sympathy and offer more assistance to those in need (Skitka et al., 2002). To the extent that conservatives (more than liberals) endorse ingroup loyalty and liberals (more than conservatives) endorse relief of harm/care (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), it is reasonable to propose that although conservatives care strongly about their ingroup, liberals’ concern is more diffuse in the sense that liberals more so than conservatives care about their ingroup *and* outgroup. Consistent with this assertion, individuals with a general prosocial orientation tend to be politically liberal (van Lange, Bekkers, Chirumbolo, & Leone, in press). Political liberals’ support for social change (*vs.* tradition) is often intended to benefit “the people” generally (Tomkins, 1965, p. 24). Hence, it is theoretically likely that potential *collective hazards* – those diffuse outcomes affecting not only the self and ingroup but “others” generally (e.g., climate change) – might be perceived as riskier by liberals than conservatives.

To summarize, the literature on socio-political ideology suggests that political conservatism, RWA and SDO should be differentially related to risk perceptions of specific types of hazards. Individuals high in RWA value social conformity, believe that the world is dangerous, are higher in needs for order and structure, and are intolerant of ambiguity (i.e., prefer predictability) (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003a; Van Hiel, Onraet, & de Pauw, 2010). Consequently, individuals higher in RWA should be especially sensitive to perceiving hazards that *violate traditional social conventions*, and hazards with an *uncertain likelihood of risk*, as more risky. In contrast, individuals high in SDO believe that the world is a competitive jungle, and generally desire to dominate the “jungle” (Duckitt, 2001). Individuals high in SDO prefer power and control over others (Altemeyer, 1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999),

viewing the world in zero-sum terms (Duckitt, 2006); for instance, those high in SDO gravitate toward positions of power (Haley & Sidanius, 2005; Pratto et al., 1994). Hence, high SDOs are presumably less likely to avoid competition, choosing to engage in challenging tasks with others. In competitive contexts, for example, high SDOs engage in extra effort, enhancing their evaluation of their performance and increasing their confidence that they will succeed (Cozzolino & Synder, 2008). Accordingly, we expect that high SDOs will be less likely to perceive competition as “risky”, and will be especially likely to perceive *competitive* hazards (e.g., sport, war, stock-market trading) as less risky. Finally, given that liberal-leaning individuals tend to be comparatively more concerned with the welfare of others (Skitka et al., 2002; van Lange et al., in press), we expected political conservatism, RWA, and SDO to be related negatively to perceiving *collective* hazards (e.g., climate change or pesticide use) as risky.

Risk Perceptions

Interestingly, there is a noticeable discrepancy in how experts and laypeople determine risk. Whereas experts rely on “technical estimates” (e.g., cost-benefit analyses), laypeople rely on “other characteristics” (Slovic, 1987, p.283). That is, for laypeople risk assessments involve *perceptions* more than calculations. As a way of categorizing hazards, Slovic proposed a taxonomy of these “other” hazard characteristics. He organized hazards according to two broad factors, but cautioned that his factor structure should not be considered “universal” (i.e., it could vary by sample and depend upon the specific hazards being investigated). Based on the relevant risk factors he examined at the time, Slovic found two broad factors. Dread Risk can be defined by risks (e.g., nuclear power, nuclear weapons) perceived of as uncontrollable (*vs.* controllable); involuntary (*vs.* voluntary); potentially globally catastrophic (*vs.* not globally catastrophic); not easily (*vs.* easily) reduced; potentially fatal consequences (*vs.* not fatal); inequitable (*vs.*

equitable) distribution of risks and benefits; and increasing (*vs.* decreasing) risk. Unknown Risk, can be defined by risks (e.g., chemical technologies) perceived of as unobservable (*vs.* observable); unknown to those exposed (*vs.* known to those exposed); delayed (*vs.* immediate effects); new (*vs.* old) risk; and risks unknown (*vs.* known) to science. Hazards considered high on both factors can be further classified as having increased potential to elicit greater social or collective impact. In order to reflect threats relevant to the modern Western world, particularly those most relevant to current political debates (e.g., terrorism, climate change), we substantially expanded the domains of hazard originally explored by Slovic. Consequently, we expected that although perceived risks should be meaningfully related to each other, any factor structure derived would presumably differ from that of Slovic.

Therefore, in the present study, we explore potential associations between socio-political ideologies (political conservatism, RWA, and SDO) and perceptions of risk relating to different dimensions of hazards. We anticipated that: (a) RWA would relate to perceiving hazards violating traditional social conventions, and those with uncertain likelihood of risk, as more risky; (b) SDO would relate to perceiving competitive hazards as non-risky; and (c) a liberal ideology would relate to perceiving collective hazards as risky. These potential links between risk perceptions and socio-political ideology were explored among a sample of American adults.

Method

Participants and Procedure

American participants ($n=387$; $mean_{age}=32.89$, range 18 to 72; 58.7% women; 77.3% identified as White) completed a survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) for \$1. Participants self-identified as “liberal” (40.3%), “conservative”

(26.6%), or “neither” (33.1%). Participants completed measures of liberal-conservative political orientation, RWA, SDO, and perceived domain risks.

Measures

Political conservatism (vs. liberalism). Participants indicated how politically liberal or conservative they were on a scale from 1-*extremely liberal* to 9-*extremely conservative* in terms of their general outlook, social policy, and economic policy (Skitka et al., 2002). Higher scores indicated greater political conservatism ($\alpha=.87$, $M=4.49$, $SD=1.97$).

Right-wing authoritarianism. Participants completed a 12-item version of the RWA scale (i.e., the “continuing 12” items; see Altemeyer, 1996; e.g., “Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral and traditional beliefs”) on a scale from 1-*strongly disagree* to 7-*strongly agree*. Higher scores indicated greater RWA ($\alpha=.93$, $M=3.05$, $SD=1.46$).

Social dominance orientation. The 16-item SDO₆ scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; e.g., “Inferior groups should stay in their place”) was administered with a scale ranging from 1-*do not agree at all* to 7-*strongly agree*. Higher scores indicated greater SDO ($\alpha=.92$, $M=2.63$, $SD=1.20$).

Perceptions of risk. Participants were asked to “indicate the degree of risk related to” 38 items (shown in Table 3) on a scale from 1-*no risk at all* to 7-*a great deal of risk*. Thirty of the items (e.g., X-rays, hunting, motor vehicles) were from Slovic (1987). Eight items reflecting more contemporary risks were added (e.g., climate change, mortgages, terrorist attacks). Six subscales were created based on factor analysis results (see Results section). Higher scores indicated greater perceived risk.

Results

Perceptions of Risk Domains

A principal components analysis (with varimax rotation) on the 38 risk items generated 6 factors to extract (eigenvalues 11.58, 3.24, 2.29, 1.69, 1.46, 1.32). (A factor-loadings table is available from the first author). In labelling the factors, we relied heavily on characteristics identified by Slovic (1987). Six subscales were therefore created to reflect each factor. The first rotated factor reflected items that pose relatively minimal risk to individuals and are familiar. In terms of Slovic's characteristics, the consequences of these hazards are not fatal and are low in social impact. Everyday Risks to Self items included contraceptives, x-rays, vaccinations, food preservatives, over the counter medication. The second rotated factor reflected items known for posing health risks for involved individuals. In Slovic's terms, the consequences of such hazards are immediate, observable, and low in social impact. Health Risks for Self items included fire-fighting, hunting, mountain climbing, police work, large construction. Known risks that someone would voluntarily expose themselves to comprised the third rotated factor. With respect to Slovic's characteristics, such hazards are known and low in social impact. Voluntary Risks for Self items included alcohol, flying, railroads, motor vehicles, swimming. The fourth rotated factor involved risks associated with inherently competitive activities. As with the third factor, these risks are known and low in social impact; however, those comprising the third factor are not inherently competitive. Competitive Risks items included high-risk investment, being a soldier, motor-cross. Relatively documented and unpredictable collective risks (common fate among society) reflected the fifth and sixth rotated factors, respectively. In terms of Slovic's characteristics, both factors are high in potential social impact. Documented Collective Risks (items included climate change, handguns, smoking, pesticides), and Unpredictable Collective

Risks (items included mortgages, terrorist attacks, nuclear power). Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the subscales are shown in Table 1.

Risk Perception and Socio-Political Ideology

Political conservatism related with RWA ($r = .62$) and with SDO ($r = .42$), and RWA correlated with SDO ($r = .41$) ($ps < .001$). As revealed in Table 2, political conservatism (*vs.* liberalism) related to perceiving greater risk for voluntary hazards for self, and perceiving less risk for documented collective risks, as expected. Greater RWA related to perceiving greater risk for everyday risks to self, voluntary risks for self, unpredictable collective risks, yet related to perceiving less risk of documented collective risks. Greater SDO was associated with perceiving less risk for health hazards for self, competitive risks, documented collective risks, and unpredictable collective risks political risks.

Given that demographic characteristics relate to both risk perception and political orientation (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Rolison, Hanoach & Wood, 2012; Knight, 1999), we also examined associations between the socio-political ideology variables and risk perceptions after controlling statistically for these characteristics. The reported associations held after controlling for age, gender, education, and income, supporting our contention that individual differences in ideology *per se* underlie these risk perception patterns. For the interested reader, correlations between the individual hazard items and each of the socio-political ideologies are shown in Table 3.

Discussion

Investigating psychological underpinnings of risk perceptions that could impact social/political relevant behaviours (e.g., voting) is critical. In his highly-cited *Science* article, Slovic (1987) examined risk perceptions of hazards in the hopes of “providing a basis for

understanding and anticipating public responses to hazards” and “improving the communication of risk information among lay people, technical experts, and decision-makers” (p. 280). Because public policy is indirectly determined by the voting public, risk perceptions of lay people are as important, if not more, than the calculations of experts. Discovering that risk perceptions of conservative- and liberal-leaning individuals differ by domain, even in non-political domains (the majority of hazards examined in the present research were not politically-charged), suggests that absolute risk, as specified by experts, might have less influence than ideologically-based subjective perceptions of risk in shaping public policy.

The socio-political ideology measures were differentially correlated with the risk perception domains. RWA (but not SDO) related to perceiving greater risk of everyday risks to self and voluntary risks for self (this domain also correlated positively with political conservatism). In contrast, SDO (but not RWA) related to perceiving lower risk of health risks for self and competitive risks. Individuals higher in RWA seemed particularly sensitive to “personal danger” threats, especially everyday threats. The preference for familiarity among those higher in RWA (Jost et al., 2003a) appears to influence their risk perceptions, reporting heightened sensitivity to familiar (everyday) risks. Individuals higher in SDO, however, appeared relatively non-averse to inherently or explicitly competitive risks. Those higher in SDO perceived *less* risk of hazards that are, in actuality, quite risky (e.g., high-risk investments; fighting in war). This finding is noteworthy given that those higher in SDO gravitate to hierarchy-enhancing political and corporate positions where economic decisions are made (Haley & Sidanius, 2005). The finding that RWA and SDO showed opposing relations with unpredictable collective risks, such that those higher in RWA perceive these hazards as riskier whereas those higher in SDO perceive these hazards as less risky, highlights the threat-sensitive

versus risk-non-averse characteristics of individuals who are higher in RWA and SDO (see also McFarland, 2005). Critically, our findings suggest that the long-standing assumption that conservatives are particularly risk-averse depends on the specific socio-political ideology. Despite SDO reflecting a core component of political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003), individuals higher in SDO perceived most potential hazards as *less* risky – a pattern inconsistent with the commonly assumed conservative-threat relation; the positive threat-conservatism link is therefore not characteristic of those higher in SDO. Importantly, these findings are consistent with Duckitt's (2001) proposition that RWA and SDO are guided by distinct motivations and worldviews (the world as dangerous or competitive, respectively).

Historically researchers have focused primarily on the link between political conservatism and threat, with relatively little attention to risk-sensitivity among liberals. In our community sample, liberal-leaning individuals (i.e., low conservatism, low RWA, low SDO) perceived documented collective hazards, such as climate change and pesticides, as psychologically riskier than did conservative-leaning individuals. Liberal-leaning individuals clearly *do* perceive threat; however, they are particularly sensitive to diffuse threats that can affect not only the self but others more collectively (in Slovic's terms, those that might have greater social impact). Socially dominant individuals, in contrast, perceive collective hazards as less risky, consistent with their dog-eat-dog worldview.

Why would political conservatives and those higher in RWA perceive less risk in some domains, given that political conservatism and RWA theoretically relate to greater threat-sensitivity (Altemeyer, 1996; Cohrs & Ibler, 2009; Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003a)? The specific hazards in the documented collective risk domain are politically-charged, meaning that support/opposition is connected to a specific political orientation. Collective risks, like global

warming and gun-use, are relatively diffuse, or spread across people, rather than personal. This pattern of results is consistent with previous research showing that liberals are particularly concerned more with moral foundations pertaining to the harm and care of others (Graham et al., 2009). Extending research in other disciplines, in the current study we demonstrate possible psychological reasons that could underlie apparent “political” differences. In particular, our results show that risk perceptions, even those unrelated to the political domain, might underlie basic psychological differences between politically liberal and conservative individuals. The hazards in the documented collective risk domain – at least relative to those in the other domains – imply potential global harm, not just harm to the self (i.e., climate change affects the global population). Our findings suggest that risk perception is tied to ideology – whether or not a political liberal or conservative perceives risk has much to do with the domain of risk in question.

In the future, researchers might investigate whether risk perception differences are a result of psychological differences in concern for others (as we propose), or whether such risk perception differences are the product of ideological scripts, for instance. Individuals high in RWA perceive the world as dangerous (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001, 2006; Jost et al., 2003a) and can be characterised as threat sensitive. However, compared with political conservatism and SDO, RWA showed the weakest correlations with the risk perception factors in the present study. In the future it would be fruitful to investigate further the types of hazards uniquely associated with certain ideologies, and whether contextual factors influence the nature these associations. Might the relation between RWA and risk perceptions, for example, be stronger in pronounced social or economic threat situations?

A number of limitations of the current research should be noted. First, in interpreting our findings, the cultural context of our study – the U.S., an especially polarized nation ideologically – bears consideration. Cross-cultural comparisons would clearly be informative in future research. Note also that our sample was somewhat liberally-skewed; however, we emphasize that *relative differences* in ideology nonetheless predicted risk perceptions. Although a nationally representative sample would be ideal, we recruited participants into a survey on “social attitudes and decisions and behaviour” through mTurk - a recruitment tool that provides high-value data with greater diversity (and hence more representative) relative to university samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Finally, in our labelling our factors, we borrowed conceptually from the well-cited Slovic (1987) approach; however, we made subtle variations to the labels based on the particular factor structure obtained given our specific list of previously unconsidered risk items that are relevant to the contemporary world (e.g., climate change).

Conclusions

Politically-conservative individuals and those higher in RWA are threat-sensitive, and individuals higher in SDO are driven by competitive motivations to dominate (Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003a). We additionally reveal that liberal-leaning individuals are also risk-sensitive, perceiving *collective hazards* as riskier than do political conservatives. This contributes to a growing body of literature illustrating the implications of basic psychological differences between conservatives and liberals, such as the divergent preferences for books and music (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). This literature increasingly suggests that liberal-leaning and conservative-leaning individuals psychologically operate in divergent ways, enjoying different activities and perceiving distinct risks (even on non-political topics).

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Table 1

Descriptives and inter-correlations among risk perception subscales

	Mean (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Everyday Risks to Self	3.19 (1.03)	.88					
2. Health Risks for Self	4.88 (1.10)	.53	.84				
3. Voluntary Risks for Self	3.85 (0.95)	.66	.65	.83			
4. Competitive Risks	5.08 (0.99)	.35	.57	.45	.76		
5. Documented Collective Risks	5.02 (1.10)	.46	.52	.41	.38	.66	
6. Unpredictable Collective Risks	4.85 (1.24)	.46	.43	.36	.35	.40	.59

Note. $N=387$. All correlations significant at $p < .001$. Alphas reported in diagonal.

Table 2

Correlations between Risk Perceptions and Psychological Conservatism

	Political Conservatism (vs. Liberalism)		Right-Wing Authoritarianism		Social Dominance Orientation	
Everyday Risks to Self	.04	(.05)	.18**	(.16**)	-.05	(.01)
Health Risks for Self	.03	(.03)	.07	(.04)	-.22**	(-.15**)
Voluntary Risks for Self	.12*	(.12*)	.15**	(.13**)	-.05	(.01)
Competitive Risks	.00	(-.02)	-.05	(-.08)	-.22**	(-.16**)
Documented Collective Risks	-.34**	(-.36**)	-.16**	(-.18**)	-.39**	(-.36**)
Unpredictable Collective Risks	.03	(.04)	.16**	(.14**)	-.15**	(-.10 [†])

Note. $N=387$, ** $p < .010$, * $p < .05$ [†] $p = .057$. Partial correlations controlling for age, gender, income, and education are in parentheses.

Table 3

Correlations between Socio-Political Ideology and Individual Risk Items

	Political Conservatism (vs. liberalism)	Right-Wing Authoritarianism	Social Dominance Orientation
Everyday Risks to Self	.04	.18**	-.05
Contraceptives	.27**	.33**	.10*
Electric power (non-nuclear)	-.03	.06	-.01
Food colouring	-.01	.12*	-.08
Food preservatives	-.04	.07	-.10*
Home appliances	.01	.09	.02
Over the counter medication	-.02	.18**	-.02
Power mowers	.05	.09	-.03
Prescription antibiotics	-.06	.04	-.04
Spray cans	-.04	.13*	-.09
X-rays	.07	.12*	-.11*
Vaccinations	.12*	.15*	-.00
Health Risks for Self	.03	.07	-.22**
Fire fighting	-.01	-.01	-.25**
Hunting	-.07	.03	-.16*
Large construction	.02	.06	-.15*

Mountain climbing	.07	.09	-.11*
Police work	.08	.07	-.21**
Surgery	.06	.10*	-.13*
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Voluntary Risks for Self	.12*	.15**	-.05
Alcoholic beverages	.19**	.26**	-.01
Bicycles	.08	.10	.07
Commercial aviation	.08	.16**	-.08
General (private) aviation	.04	.03	-.03
Motorcycles	.03	.00	-.04
Motor vehicles	-.02	-.03	-.12*
Railroads	.04	.11*	-.03
Skiing	.12*	.11*	-.03
Swimming	.13*	.14**	.00
<hr/>			
Competitive Risks	.00	-.05	-.22**
High risk investment	-.05	-.04	-.21**
High school/college football	.01	-.05	-.09
Motor-cross	.06	-.02	-.14*
NASCAR	.03	.02	-.11*
War/being a soldier	-.08	-.13*	-.32**
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Documented Collective Risks	-.34**	-.16**	-.39**
Climate change	-.40**	-.26**	-.29**
Handguns	-.28**	-.10	-.31**
Smoking	-.08	-.05	-.21**
Pesticides	-.16*	-.00	-.28**
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Unpredictable Collective Risks	.03	.16**	-.15**
Mortgages	.00	.07	-.01
Nuclear power	-.03	.10*	-.21**
Terrorist attacks	.09	.18**	-.11*

Note. $N = 387$, ** $p < .010$, * $p < .05$.